Association for Monitoring and Advocacy of Government Pensions (AMAGP)

NPO Registration No: 198-822

SEMPER VIGILANS

The Association for Monitoring and Advocacy of Government Pensions: A volunteer independent group of pensioners and civil servants concerned about the long term viability of the GEPF and sustainability of its return on investments.

www.AMAGP.co.za

GEPF Watchdog - Waghond

GEPF Forum

NEWSLETTER NO 3 of 2023

AMAGP – Association for Monitoring and Advocacy of Government Pensions
AR – annual report
BOT – Board of Trustees [of the GEPF]
FSCA – Financial Sector Conduct Authority [previously the FSB]
GEPF - Government Employees' Pension Fund
PIC – Public Investment Corporation
PSA – Public Servants' Association
ROI – return on investment
SCOF – Standing Committee on Finance
SCOPA - Standing Committee on Public Accounts
SOE – state owned entity

The Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) is Africa's largest pension fund. We have more than 1.2 million active members, in excess of 450 000 pensioners and beneficiaries, and assets worth more than R1.61 trillion. GEPF is a defined benefit pension fund that was established in May 1996 when various public sector funds were consolidated. Our core business, which is governed by the Government Employees Pension Law (or GEP Law), as amended, is to manage and administer pensions and other benefits for government employees in South Africa. https://www.GEPF.gov.za/ dd 22 February 2023.

***WE ARE THE OWNERS OF THE GEPF** and we have the right to expect the GEPF BOT and the PIC to manage and invest OUR money in a responsible and profitable way, to the advantages of members and pensioners. Note the misbalance: the single pensioner on the BOT representing all 450 000 pensioners and the 15 representatives from the multitude of trade unions and government departments representing the 1,2 million active members.*

The AMAGP does not want any GEPF member to leave the Fund, because it still is the best pension fund in the RSA. BUT, we as members and owners of the Fund have to protect it against abuse.

The Editor's Word

I know I've said this before, bear with me. Please page through the GEPF website. The assets are R1,61trn on the landing page. However, scrolling down on the same page to the footer, you will see the value is R2,3trn. Anyone want to guess where the missing R0,7trn is?

Confirming the figures used in the comments are taken from the 2022 GEPF AR, which on its own reflects the GEPF financial status as at the beginning of 2022. Said figures currently about a year old.

"Friends,
The video in which Mr Geordan Hill-Lewis warns against an attack on the Public Service Fund (GEPF) is currently being distributed by unknown persons. This causes panic among members of the pension fund and AMAGP is inundated with inquiries about the authenticity of the video.

Please note that the video was already made in 2020 when the assessment by Cosatu and others of R256 billion on the pension fund to help pay off Eskom's debt took place. Mr Hill-Lewis, currently mayor of Cape Town and then shadow finance minister, and other politicians helped us to repel the attack at the time. We still owe them a debt of gratitude.

The matter is now considered by some to be topical again as aid of approximately the same amount to Eskom is again in the news. However, we are not currently aware of any attempt to use the funds of the pension fund for this purpose, but members of AMAGP can trust us to remain vigilant. We will keep our members informed of developments. As in the past, we will act in the interest of our members if necessary.

It is surprising that we are particularly inundated with inquiries from non-members of AMAGP about the video currently being circulated. We are flattered and believe that the volume of inquiries confirms the necessity for the existence of AMAGP. Perhaps the time is now ripe for such persons to join AMAGP. For this purpose, an application form is attached.

Please join and strengthen our hand. No membership fee is payable but donations are welcome because AMAGP needs funds to further protect your fund.
Bank : FNB Brooklyn, AMAGP Business Account, Account Number 62743347454 Branch Code 251345

Adamus P. Stemmet
Durbanville
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Link to Membership page: amagp membership (coffeecup.com)"

SLAPP (strategic litigation against public participation) is a well known tactic used by large business, where litigation is drawn out endlessly by said large business, up to the point where the smaller litigator can't fund the litigation anymore. Often such litigation is about ecological distress caused by big business operations, with the few against big business. The Constitutional Court has ruled on this recently to the advantage of the smaller litigator. For more information, Google is your friend.

The case between the PIC and Ayo is being heard this week [at last]. This has to do with the murky happenings when the PIC invested in Ayo, the intricate paperwork and contracts, claims and counter claims. The articles below don't provide the detail and background, the share price history and comments on the net is ample and clear.

There are questions asked about the recent pension increase. The GEPF was/is so excited about its huge increase in value a year ago [see the first paragraph above] and the exciting increase in revenue, far above the paltry percentage increase granted to pensioners. However, it doesn't seem to relate to realistic pension increases, leaving pensioners to question the real state of funding and finances at the GEPF.

Now for news from the media

The dividends paid by Amplats is going to be far below previous dividends, loadshedding being a major cause. Pity.

Two articles about the PIC/Ayo court case. I suspect this is going to take some time to come to a judgement, making lawyers and advocates richer.

Tongaat/Hulett is still in the news. It doesn't seem as if it is going to improve. The auditors Deloitte seem to be part of the reason for the business rescue process.

SAMLAM acquired Brightrock as part of its short term insurance business. Not sure if we knew Brightrock existed.

Adamus has a brief letter for the Rapport, asking why its business news section sees the PIC as a well-run, while there is the murky unlisted investments, Ayo, etc. Good question, don't you think?

Confirming our investment in Premier Fishing is nearing its end, seems to be quite a loss.

NUUSNEWSNUUS

Synopsis

Amplats slashes dividend payout by R50bn

The full dividend for 2022 will be about 60% smaller than 2021's R80bn pay out

BL Premium
20 February 2023
By Denene Erasmus

Platinum group metals (PGMs) miner Anglo American Platinum (Amplats) cut its full-year dividend pay out by R50bn after its profit for the 12 months to end December plunged by 38% as high costs and lower volumes ate into the group's bottom-line.

The mine said it will pay out R115 per share, or R30bn to shareholders, from R300 or R80bn the previous year.

A slight easing of PGM basket prices, high costs and a 26% drop in sales volumes cut headline earnings to R48bn compared with last year's R79bn, the company announced in its annual results released on Monday.

The company, valued at R296,7bn on the JSE, reported that its total refined production for the year was down 25% to 3,8 million PGM ounces, affected by the delay in the completion of the Polokwane smelter rebuild. Refined production guidance for 2023 is 3,6 - 4 million PGM ounces.

The impact of load curtailment that flowed through to final production last year was about 30 000 refined ounces, Amplats CEO Viljoen told Business Day. "Important to consider that by the time [the product] flows through we have already made a number of upstream plans to mitigate the impact of the curtailment." "We have definitely seen an increase in curtailment since the end of last year and just in the last week again load-shedding has been at high levels."

Viljoen said they have run some scenarios to estimate what the impact on power supply disruptions will be on the business this year. One such scenario assumes curtailment on level 4 for one day a week and at level 2 for two days, so in total on about 150 days of the year. "That will impact our refined production after all the mitigation we have put in place by 5%."

Given its refined production guidance for the year, such a scenario could, at the upper end, curb output by about 200 000 ounces.

2022 saw a weaker average PGM dollar basket price (down 8% to $2 551 per PGM ounce), but a weaker rand boosted the rand price by 2% to a new record of R41 453 per PGM ounce. Amplats said. However, its profitability was affected by above-inflation cost increases in utilities and consumables.

Amplats expects that there could be a small deficit in PGM supply in 2023 given than platinum's underlying surplus has fallen in recent years as supply has underperformed and autocatalyst demand has improved.

"In 2023, whether it is in surplus or deficit will depend on the direction of investment demand — a return to more historically normal investor inflows would mean it will be in a small deficit."

Amplats' share price closed down 1,97% at R1 118,45 after having already lost a quarter of its value since the beginning of the year.

Comment

We have about R23,8bn in Amplats.

Synopsis

PIC tackles Ayo in court

But there is little left of the R4,3bn it invested in the company in 2017

Moneyweb
By Adriaan Kruger
9 March 2023

Despite its dwindling cash resources, Ayo continued to pay dividends every year – and its cash flow statements illustrated without any doubt where the money came from. Image: Moneyweb

People immediately started to question the motivation, wisdom and procedures when it became known that the PIC had invested R4,3bn on behalf of the GEPF in Ayo Technology Solutions at the time of its JSE-listing in December 2017.

The questions were warranted. The R4,3b bought the PIC an interest of only 29% in Ayo, despite the sudden cash windfall being equal to 92% of the small computer company's assets of R4,7bn.

African Equity Empowerment Investments (AEEI) got the bulk of the shares, ending up with more than 49% of Ayo. Public shareholders owned the rest, just less than 22%.

However, financial statements for the year to August 2017 disclosed that Ayo owned very little in the form of operating assets prior to the PIC's investment. It made a profit of only R29mn in the 2017 financial year, according to the comparative figures presented in the 2018 annual report. The GEPF's R4,3bn was by far the biggest asset, and interest on the money was the biggest source of profit for Ayo from 2018.

Years of allegations, media reports and investigations, including a formal commission of inquiry that investigated the PIC, resulted in the PIC eventually admitting that the investment in Ayo was a mistake.

Ayo noted in its most recent annual report (for the year to end August 2022) that the PIC and GEPF are going to court to try and get the R4,3bn back. "The summons seeks a declaration that the subscription agreement entered into by the PIC with Ayo be declared unlawful and set aside and that Ayo be ordered to pay the PIC R4,3bn together with interest of 10,25% per annum accrued from 22 December 2017 to date of final payment.

"Ayo has instructed its attorneys to oppose the action," the company told its shareholders. On Monday, Ayo issued a Sens announcement to inform shareholders that the court hearing will commence on 7 March.

The PIC issued a press statement to say that it intends to pursue its claim vigorously". "Through its legal representatives, the PIC will present evidence to the court, which is the appropriate forum to assess the evidence and adjudicate on this matter. The PIC has an obligation and responsibility to ensure that appropriate action is undertaken to protect the value of assets under its management, for the benefit of its clients. The PIC will continue to do so through due and proper legal processes," according to the statement

Stable door

Litigation takes time, but to look to Ayo to repay the R4,3bn five years after the event has given the horse time to stroll away at a leisurely pace. Ayo's annual financial statements for the years 2018 to 2022 show that most of the money is gone. The financial statements as at the end of August 2022 show that there is only R1,1bn left.

The PIC is unlikely to get the full amount and interest on the money if the court rules in its favour. At a rate of 10,25% per annum from the time of the investment in December 2017, the PIC will be seeking nearly R7bn from Ayo.

The figures say it all …

The computer and information technology company last made a profit before interest and tax in 2017, before AEEI and its parent, Sekunjalo Investment Holdings, became involved. [*Source: Ayo annual reports]*

Ayo posted a loss before interest and tax in every year since the 2018 financial year. It only reported profits after tax due to interest received on its big cash balance, but only until the 2020 financial year. Its cash reserves, the PIC money, disappeared quickly.

By 2021, growing operational losses exceeded the interest received on dwindling cash resources. Ayo still paid dividends every year, and the group's cash flow statements over the years illustrated without any doubt where the money came from.

Ayo recorded a big net cash inflow of R4,2bn in the year to August 2018, the proceeds of the private placing of shares with GEPF. It reported a negative cash flow of nearly R625mn in 2019, including gross dividends of more than R175mn.

The dividend remained high every year thereafter and cash flow remained negative. Ayo reported net cash outflow of more than R1bn in each of the 2021 and 2022 financial years, and probably has a few hundred million less by now. According to the balance sheet, the whole group had an equity value of only R3,1bn, including intangible assets and goodwill.

Share price crash

The crash in the share price to R3,90 values the group at only R1,34bn. Ayo may not even survive. It doesn't have enough money and does not make enough profit.

Yet it is undeterred. "The company has since been reconfigured into a technology holding company and will be able to continue to trade as such through the portfolio of investments it holds should the PIC and GEPF be successful in their application," Ayo noted in its annual report.

"Certain subsidiaries of Ayo have been in existence for more than 20 years, delivering satisfactory trading performance and dividend income for Ayo. These subsidiaries are expected to continue trading at optimal levels independent of the PIC funding."

Comment

From the report it seems the dividends being paid were from the initial investments in Ayo, of which the PIC amount is decreasing drastically.
The share price has been flat for the past three years, fluctuating up and down between R5 and R1,40.
There are other reports in the media about the court case, but I found this one to be the most balanced one. Read any other reports about the court case with circumspect.
The article below has a totally different but very interesting view.

Synopsis

The PIC v AYO — can it ever be illegal to make a stupid investment decision?

Former PIC executive Victor Seanie. (Screenshots: Youtube / SABC)

Daily Maverick
By Tim Cohen
9 March 2023

I'm mesmerised by the PIC case against technology company AYO, currently playing out in the Western Cape High Court. This is an ongoing case, so it's important to note that evidence is unfolding, and AYO has not yet put up its defence. But so far, it seems to me, the case hinges on an odd notion: is it illegal to make a really stupid investment? I mean, really, really stupid? After all, it's not as though that hasn't happened before in the history of investing.

It turns out it's not that simple, of course. The uncontested facts are that the PIC pumped R4,3bn into the company as part of its JSE listing for a 29% stake in AYO, implicitly valuing the company at R14,8bn. So, what was the company earning at the time which would have justified that kind of investment? You would think, well, tech companies: good prospects, go ahead and value the thing pretty high, say at a 20 price/equity ratio. So that means you would expect the company's earnings to be R740mn annually.

Oddly enough, the pre-listing statement, dutifully prepared by PSG Corporate Finance and signed off by Grant Thornton, said the company was projecting in its 2018 financial year, the subsequent year, earnings of about that: R764,014,000 to be exact. So a P/E of around 18.

And what was it earning at the time? Well, we only found that out much, much later because — and this is a weirdly odd coincidence — the earnings prior to 2018 were not included in the pre-listing statement. But when the 2018 annual report came out, it turned out that the company's turnover in 2017 was R478,7mn, and its after-tax profit was R27mn. I am not making this up. The PIC invested R4,3b in a company that was making R27mn a year.

Thumping dividends

And, as we now know, the R764mn profit that was supposed to materialise in 2018, well it never happened. In fact, there was a loss at the operational level. And there has been a loss every year since. But that, as we also know, hasn't stopped AYO from declaring thumping dividends every year, so many that the PIC's investment, now five years later, is more or less gone.

This is all very bad for the PIC because it now looks like a complete, total financial idiot, which is not good for an organisation charged with investing the retirement savings of the public service. Hence, the court case, in which it is essentially trying to clear its name. But I return to my opening question: is it really illegal to make a stupid investment?

Some weird stuff obviously happened for this investment to take place and that, essentially, is the PIC's case. It is not arguing that it made a bad investment; it is arguing that it was deliberately misled by AYO and that its own procedures were flouted.

Just how badly they were flouted is becoming apparent, and it is an eye-opener. The opening witness was former PIC assistant portfolio manager Victor Seanie. Although he was only listed as an "assistant portfolio manager", Seanie's experience and training were and are extensive. He has dual honours in accounting and business administration and worked previously for PwC, Allan Gray and Kagiso Asset Management.

Dan Matjila

Seanie testified that he only saw the pre-listing statement the day before the deal was signed by the then CEO of the PIC, Dan Matjila, on 14 December 2017, just weeks before the listing. Normally, it would be his job to make a recommendation, but when he did read the statement he thought the subscription by the PIC was unlikely because the finances didn't add up, so it would never go ahead.

But it did. By all accounts, Matjila just bulldozed it through. Seanie testified that the time it took was unusually short, his recommendation was critical of the transaction as proposed, and it was not procedural because the investment committee hadn't approved it at the time Matjila agreed to the deal.

You have to feel for Seanie; he is proof that whenever wrongdoing happens, someone innocent gets hurt. In this case, it was him. After Matjila left, Seanie was summarily fired and my guess is that at this point, everybody was trying to cover his/her ass and find a scapegoat. The music stopped, and it was Seanie who got left without a chair.

AYO's rebuttal in the court papers echoes my question. All of the statements in the pre-listing statement, including those from Thornton, were ringfenced — as they always are — with warnings that these are "anticipated" events, not guaranteed. They are projections, not promises. Furthermore, AYO says, the listing was duly signed off by the CEO of the organisation, and Lebogang Molebatsi, who was the acting executive head of listed investments, and that is what matters.

Implicitly, I think what they are arguing is that if the PIC didn't follow its own procedures, well that's something for the PIC to fix. It's not their fault. Whether AYO misled the PIC is a trickier argument, but, as I mentioned, they didn't claim any of their grandiose plans would happen, they just said they thought they might. Or something.

This is of course for the court to decide, but you have to ask: isn't there a point at which the claims of future business success are so unlikely and so egregious, they constitute fraud? **DM/BM**

Comment

The opinion of the writer is abundantly clear.

Synopsis

Auditing giant Deloitte's R260m Tongaat Hulett settlement 'pathetic' – Logan

Tongaat Hulett said to have originally sought more than R1bn in compensation after audit firm signed off on what turned out to be bogus accounts.

Moneyweb
By Roy Cokayne
24 February 2023

Image: Supplied

Deloitte has agreed to pay the sugar and property group R260mn to settle claims against the firm, without any admission of liability.

Shareholder activist Chris Logan described the settlement amount as "pathetic" on Thursday, following the settlement agreement being disclosed in a JSE Sens by Tongaat Hulett's business rescue practitioners (BRPs).

He told Moneyweb that the R260mn settlement does not even recover the R272mn in actual audit fees paid to the auditing giant from 2011 until 2021, the time when the fraud started and Deloitte left, without weighting these fees to take into account the impact of inflation.

Logan said the audit fees paid to Deloitte represent only a small component because the "real damage" was that Deloitte failed to pick up the fraud. "If Deloitte had, shareholders supposedly would have been able to see that the management team were mismanaging the business and kick them out and the business would not have been fatally destroyed," he said.

Logan said that by the time shareholders realised the business was in serious trouble in 2018, Tongaat Hulett was technically insolvent. He noted that the 2018 audited accounts showed equity of R11bn, when the actual equity was negative R1bn as per restated accounts.

"Even after it was known that Deloitte had messed up, the board kept them on and Deloitte received R88mn in 2020 as the audit fee," he added.

Charles Liasides, a director of Artemis Investments, which holds an about 15% shareholding in Tongaat, said the settlement amount seems low. "Considering what Steinhoff received and the abysmal accounting they [Deloitte] performed, I think they got off quite lightly and have walked away with a very favourable settlement for them," he added.

"We had certainly anticipated a much higher number. Without a doubt, the accounting performed by Deloitte over that period was a contributing factor to the demise of the company," he said.

Steinhoff settlement

The reference to Steinhoff relates to Deloitte in the Netherlands and South Africa agreeing in 2021 to pay up to €70mn (R1,22bn) in compensation to claimants who are suing Steinhoff.

Deloitte concluded that settlement without an admission of liability for losses incurred by Steinhoff and its stakeholders as a result of the accounting irregularities in the conglomerate.

The claims against Deloitte in the Tongaat Hulett matter arose from and relate to the firm's appointment as auditor of the company for the financial years 2012 to 2018. The former sugar giant originally sought compensation from Deloitte reportedly worth more than R1 billion after the auditor signed off on what turned out to be bogus accounts.

Tongaat Hulett's BRPs said on Thursday: "After taking advice in this regard, the BRPs are of the considered opinion that a settlement on these terms is in the best interests of the company."

Tongaat Hulett has reported operating losses totalling R1,61bn over its last four financial years from 2018 until 2021.

Fraud charges

An investigation spanning almost two years into the accounting irregularities at the Durban-based group forced the company to restate its financial results for two prior years and led to the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) in February 2022 charging several former executives and a Deloitte audit partner with fraud totalling R3,5bn.

Six former Tongaat executives – Peter Staude, Murray Munro, Michael Deighton, Rory Wilkinson, Kamlasagrie Singh and Samantha Shukla – and Deloitte audit partner on the Tongaat Hulett audit Gavin Kruger appeared in the Durban commercial crime court in February 2022 in relation to fraud charges and were all granted bail.

The charges stemmed from alleged fraudulent activity between March 2015 and September 2018 related to the alleged backdating of land sale agreements, which had a significant impact on the company's financial results and led to a loss of value to shareholders.

The JSE suspended trading in the shares of Tongaat Hulett on 19 July 2022 because of the failure of the company to publish its financial results within the stipulated time period.

Tongaat's board of directors decided in October 2022 to embark on voluntary business rescue proceedings after the company's lenders rejected the proposed restructuring plan and declined to advance further funds to the company.

The BRPs on Thursday reported that Tongaat Hulett Limited (THL), Tongaat Hulett Sugar South Africa and Voermol Feeds have requested a time extension for the publication of the business rescue plan to 30 June 2023.

Comment

We have about R224mn in Tongaat. Sad to see the livelihood of so many destroyed by the greed of a few.

Synopsis

SANLAM to take over Brightrock

Watch out world says CEO Schalk Malan after Brightrock's founders sell 100% to Sanlam

Biznews
8 February 2023
by Editor BizNews

Just shy of 13 years ago, Schalk Malan, Suzanne Stevens, and Sean Hanlon gave up executive jobs at Discovery Holdings to launch an insurance startup. This week their business, now SA's preferred life insurance company for independent financial advisors, became a wholly owned subsidiary of Bellville-based giant Sanlam.

Schalk Malan on selling Brightrock to Sanlam

We are more than excited. We are thrilled with the announcement and the transaction. It's definitely not the end of the dream. It is just the inflection point in the Brightrock journey. We believe this will put Brightdrop on the road to further and higher heights than ever before, with Sanlam now as the 100% shareholder, enabling the business to really achieve its objectives. We are very excited with the announcement and with this transaction.

On how the decision was arrived at and the conclusion finalised

I think a lot of entrepreneurs go through those debates. If you look at Brightrock's journey, Sanlam has been a majority shareholder for more than five years, first and foremost. And in the last five years, the business has flourished.. I think coming to this decision wasn't a difficult decision in the sense that – what's the right thing for the business going forward and really putting it on this amazing growth trajectory that we are looking forward to. Knowing that we have a partner in play that's been with us for the greater part of five or six years, through very difficult periods, through COVID. And that supported us.

The question whether 100% shareholding was right. There are various reasons for setting up the transaction, but really driving home the fact that with Brightrock now being 100% owned by Sanlam, the largest financial services company in Africa, we've access to arguably the largest balance sheet in our industry to really achieve what we set out to do. That, for us, is very exciting. Maybe to reinforce a couple of things on that is the executive team, the management team, the founders that you referred to earlier are very much in play. They will continue to build the business. In fact, we are very excited for the interesting things that lie ahead. For example, we're looking to expand and, as we're busy expanding and growing our distribution footprint in the intermediated space. I'm looking forward to growing our funeral business and then part of it is also looking to focus on what we are really good at. And those are in our intermediated individual life product as well as our funeral business.

On the comparison to other entrepreneurs in the financial services industry

Life insurance is very capital intensive and if you're on a very steep growth trajectory, like we've been on and plan to be on, it is capital hungry. It's not just talking about the infrastructure, your ICT technology developments. It also very much refers to putting new business on the books and the cost of acquisition. So that is true. The story of Brightrock is a story that's going to persist. I've used the word before in our discussions – Brightrock entered a very concretised market 11 years ago. It made a huge impact in the time that we've been in the market, seen the results, seen the impact in the market, new business positions and seeing our competitors changing their products. So all of those things mean that we've been a success story and continue to be such.

So, I don't see the fact that Sanlam owns 100% of the business taking away from that entrepreneurial journey. In fact, it shows that acting in the best interests of the business must always be paramount in the back of the entrepreneur's mind. Maybe the last point on that is if you talk to other similar entities in the Sanlam stable, like MiWay. Rene Otto built up MiWay and that was a 100% owned business from day one. He would say he is one of South Africa's leading pioneers and entrepreneurs in the short term space.

On what Sanlam is doing that is different to other corporates

That's a great question and we've often debated it. Obviously, coming up to this decision and transaction, we will continue to debate that. And as I said earlier, Sanlam's been the majority shareholder for more than five or six years and we continued on our innovation trajectory. They didn't stifle that at all. It's really seeded very deep in the Sanlam culture. I think they recognise what they're very good at and they recognise what they need to be better in certain markets. If you look at models, financial services in particular, it shows that those models do work.

Comment

We have about R1,8bn invested in SANLAM. Seems SANLAM made a good investment.

Synopsis

Our prolific letter writer once more:

Vaar die OBK werklik goed?

Redakteur,

Hoe sleg moet 'n staatsbeheerde instansie (SBI) vaar voor dit deur kommentators erken word?

Ek verwys na die artikel van 26 Februarie 2023 in Sake Rapport, waarin die Openbare Beleggingskorporasie (OBK) aangedui word as 'n SBI wat goed werk.

Ons het dieselfde mening van verskeie kommentators gehoor toe 'n groepie Staatsdienspensionarisse 'n paar jaar terug beweer het dat alles by die OBK en

Staatsdienspensioenfonds nie wel was nie. Ons is afgemaak as moeilikheidmakers wat onnodig paniek saai. AMAGP wat toe gestig is, het met groot moeite en hulp van sekere politici uiteindelik die President oorreed om n kommissie van ondersoek aan te stel.

Voor die Mpati- kommissie is skokkende inligting geplaas oor wanpraktyke in verband met miljarde se beleggings van die GEPF. Uiteindelik het die kommissie 377 aanbevelings gemaak. Ongelukkig het die kommissie se opdrag nie die GEPF ingesluit nie. Nogtans is 15 aanbevelings ten opsigte van die GEPF gemaak. Van die aanbevelings was baie ernstig en het die moontlikheid van die terugvordering van miljarde aangedui asook moontlike strafregtelike optrede ingesluit.

Om vas te stel hoeveel van die aanbevelings uitgevoer is, is ' n onbegonne taak. Beide die OBK en GEPF skuil agter hul berugte beleid van geheimhouding deur telkens, selfs aan parlementere komitees, vaagweg te verklaar dat X% van die aanbevelings uitgevoer is. Ongelukkig laat die tans gebrekkige oorsigrol van parlementêre komitees hulle daarmee wegkom. Wat uitgevoer is, of geld teruggevorder is en of strafregtelike stappe teen oortreders gedoen is, is blykbaar hoogs geheim of word om onbekende redes van belanghebbendes weggesteek.

Intussen begin onaanvaarbare goggas weer hul koppe uitsteek: Gedurende Januarie verkry die OBK n forensiese verslag ten opsigte van die diefstal van R 150 miljoen deur n senior beampte van Daybreak Farms, wat 100% in die besit van die OBK is. Op 14 Junie 2022 doen die OBK verslag aan n parlementere komitee. Hierdie misdaad word verswyg. Nou meer as n jaar na die misdaad gepleeg is, is nog geen woord gehoor oor n moontlike vervolging en/ of die terugvordering van die gesteelde geld nie. Geen optrede deur die betrokke komitee is ook bekend nie.

Jaarliks word berig oor groot verliese wat in die Isibayabeleggings (beleggings in ongelyste sake) gely word. Tans " onderpresteer" 43,4% van hierdie beleggings glo. 'n Mens sou verwag dat n belegger sulke beleggings sou staak. Nou word verneem dat die OBK hierdie beleggings, wat boonop moontlik onwettig gemaak word, reusagtig gaan uitbrei. Dit moet lekker wees om met ander mense, ongelukkig pensionarisse, se geld te mors.

Daar kan dus ongelukkig nie saam gestem word dat die OBK " goed werk " nie.

Adamus P. Stemmet

Comment

Compare the Rapport article of 26 February with the comment by Daily Maverick above.

Synopsis

Premier Fishing and Brands to delist from the JSE

BL Premium
5 March 2023
By Andries Mahlangu

Premier Fishing will soon disappear from the JSE. The group listed on the JSE six years ago at about 415c but it is now trading at 150c with market value of R390mn.

Premier Fishing and Brands will soon disappear from the JSE after the parent company Sekunjalo Investment Holdings, chaired by businessman Iqbal Survé, proposed to buy out the minority shareholders in the fishing group.

Sekunjalo has proposed to pay 160c per share in cash to minority shareholders who hold 6,14% in the fishing group. The rest of the issued shares belong to Sekunjalo group of companies, which include JSE-listed African Equity Empowerment Investments.

Premier Fishing said in a statement on Friday the listed structure was no longer beneficial to the company and its shareholders because of the low free float of its shares, as well as the "substantial" administrative costs associated with being a publicly traded entity.

The low free float came after the PIC sold its 19,7% stake in Premier Fishing to one of Sekunjalo-affiliated companies.

"The successful implementation of the proposed transaction will result in a substantial decrease in administrative costs and significantly less time and energy being required from executives in ensuring compliance with the listings requirements of the JSE," Premier Fishing said.

The Exchange Sponsors Projects Proprietary has been appointed as an independent expert to assess the merits of the proposal.

Premier Fishing listed on the JSE six years ago at about 415c but it is now trading at 150c with market value of R390m.

Comment

We have about R52mn in Premier Fishing. Another investment loss, if you compare the original listing at 415c with the offer of 160c. Interesting, invested at about the same time as the Ayo investment …

THE GEPF WATCHDOG / WAGHOND FACEBOOK PAGE

Welcome to our page.

The GEPF Watchdog/Waghond Facebook page is the social media platform of the non-profit organisation "The Association for the Monitoring and Advocacy of Government Pensions" (AMAGP). The AMAGP has only one agenda point – safeguarding the GEPF against looting and mismanagement.

We are the owners of the GEPF, and we have the right to expect the GEPF Board of Trustees, and the PIC, to manage and invest OUR money in a responsible and profitable way. To the advantages of members and pensioners!

Most of our GEPF members are content with the fact that pensioners still get their monthly pension (nd perhaps a non-inflation related increase sometimes. They are convinced by GEPF newsletters and ambitious GEPF Annual Reports that our Pension Fund is in a superb condition. The AMAGP newsletters, annua reports and press releases tell a different story.

Our Facebook and AMAGP are together more than 58 000 members and continually growing, but this isn't enough. The continued growth confirms the ever increasing concern pension fund members and pensioners have about the future of their pensions.

As a member of the GEPF (working or retired), this Facebook page will keep you updated about any developments affecting the health of YOUR Pension Fund. It also provides you with the opportunity to participate in the debate and raise issues of concern.

Please read the articles that are posted on the wall, BUT also "re" and "Files". You can get further information on our website – there is no reason to be in the dark regarding our/your Pension Fund, and what you must do as a member.

This page will only have any value for you if you join the AMAGP. Note there are no membership fees. You don't have to do any work for the AMAGP if you do not wish to do so – BUT your membership will add one more voice to AMAGP convince the government our pensions remain ours, not theirs to misuse.

Although the AMAGP Newsletter may include links providing direct access to other internet resources, including other websites, the AMAGP is not responsible for the accuracy or content of information contained in these resources or websites.